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It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.
— Nobel laureate in physics, Neils Bohr‘
A half century hence, will it be the best of times, the worst of 
times—or both? Have we reached the point where our economic system will no 
longer change—in effect, the end of history? Or is change accelerating at such 
a pace that our economic system in 2050 will be unrecognizable to most of us 
today? In the years immediately preceding the beginning of the 21st century, the 
acerbic dictum of Neils Bohr in the chapter’s epigraph was ignored and we suf­
fered a plethora of predictions, most based on little more than a few random 
anecdotes and what the predictor had for breakfast. This book is quite differ­
ent—before sketching my views about the future course of the economic sys­
tem, I want to look systematically at the most relevant evidence.
The usual platitude to justify studying the future is that it will help us make 
plans. More important, however, such an exercise is useful for understanding 
what is happening in the present, because it forces us to distinguish transient 
from more permanent changes. Thus, in this book I explore such questions as: 
What have been the key trends in the U.S. economic system in the second half 
of the 20th century and what causes underlay them? If current trends will not con­
tinue, what will replace them, and why? At what points do we lack sufficient 
knowledge, either theoretical or factual, to make responsible predictions about the 
future?
This is not an exercise in prophecy, but rather an attempt to understand the 
implications of today’s complicated economic reality. Of course, we can make 
forecasts with considerable accuracy in those cases where a well-understood 
cause underlies particular systemic changes and where other causal forces do 
not intervene. However, we reach the limit of responsible prediction in other
' Cited by Laura Lee, Bad Predictions: 2000 Years of the Best Minds Making the Worst Forecasts (2000).
!
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cases where several different causal forces impinge on the economic system and 
pull it in opposite directions, unless we have good reasons to believe that one set 
of causal forces is sufficiently strong to prevail over the others. In still other cases, 
all we can do is speak of tendencies.
An example of such an approach is found in my discussion in Chapter 10 of 
the implications of the merger wave of the 1980s and 1990s on market competi­
tion in the future. I present data showing that such mergers have led to a consid­
erable increase in market concentration over the period. Before predicting that 
market competition will decline, however, other questions require answers: How 
much influence will other relevant factors, such as increased foreign trade or the 
rise of buying and selling over the internet, exercise on the future state of compe­
tition? How long will this merger wave continue? Will these merged enterprises 
prove successful or will they later fall apart into their constituent parts? Both the 
data and the theories presented in this chapter allow considerable clarification of 
many of these issues, and I argue that there will be a strong tendency toward a 
decrease in market competition. Nevertheless, a firm prediction about the future 
of market competition is not possible from merger considerations alone. In brief, 
we can discuss the future of the economic system in a methodical fashion and set 
up direction signs for turning points, even though much of what will actually hap­
pen will depend on certain policy decisions that are difficult to predict.
In this chapter I address the following issues in turn: alternative approaches for 
analyzing the future; some ways in which alternative forms of capitalism can be 
defined; methods by which causes of change in economic systems can be sys­
tematically examined and forecast errors can be minimized; and finally, a very 
brief preview of the rest of the book.
At this point, I must also point out that this book comes in three quite separate 
parts: the discussion in the text; the brief discussion of particular points and the 
listing of certain source materials in the appendices contained in this book; and the 
more extended analysis of certain ideas and assertions that are contained in the 
“external appendices,” which can be found at my specially created website: 
www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/Economics/fpryorl/. The contents of the various 
external appendices are listed in the table of contents of this book.
A. Approaching the Topic^
Let me start by saying what this book is not about. It is not about the economy 
per se, that is, the way we will live and work and what technology has in store for
2 In this section I refer to the following sources: U.S. Commission on National Security (1999),
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us. Rather, it is about the institutions and organizations through which econom­
ic activity is channeled. This distinction receives greater attention below. It also 
does not concern itself with how the economic system should evolve or how the 
economic aspirations of U.S. citizens can best be realized. Rather, it focuses on 
changes most likely to occur, regardless of whether they are desirable or not. In 
brief, it is an exercise in positive, not normative, economics.
During most of the second half of the 20th century, the changing U.S. economic 
system was viewed from the perspective of “capitalism versus communism.” But 
after the collapse of the Soviet economy, the question has become more subtle and 
more interesting; What kind of capitalism will we have?
Some seem to believe that we have reached the most efficient and stable eco­
nomic system possible, that any future change will be relatively unimportant, and 
that the subject does not deserve further consideration. But to suppose that economic 
history will suddenly cease to be interesting once it has reached the beginning of the 
21st century defies our experience of systemic change in the 20th century. In part, 
such a view springs from a failure of imagination and an aversion to change.
Some seem to believe that the future is so unknowable that prediction is 
worthless. We can only wring our hands in utter frustration and lament along 
with the historian Immanuel Wallerstein^:
We have entered a time of troubles. The outcome is uncertain.
We cannot be sure what kind of historical system will replace the 
one in which we find ourselves. What we can know with certainty 
is that the very peculiar system in which we live, and in which the 
states have played a crucial role in supporting the processes of the 
endless accumulation of capital, can no longer continue to function.
Such overarching fatalism is inappropriate. Many aspects of economic reali­
ty are not subject to random change; they are cumulative and influenced by 
causal forces which, to a certain extent, can be analyzed. Moreover, the 
economic system—which is the focus of this analysis—usually changes 
relatively slowly.
Finally, some seem to believe that the next half-century will bring dramatic 
changes to the economic system, so that it will barely be recognizable to those
Gallopin, etal. (1997), Halal (1986), Kahn (1979), Rifkin (2000), and Wallerstein (1999, p. 75.)
3 The intellectual justification for such a position can be quite fancy, resting, for instance, on com­
plexity theory that emphasizes the existence of “points of bifurcation” or “qualitative leaps” 
when the system veers far from equilibrium. This means that we can neither predict when such 
changes will occur nor what the outcome will be and can only rely on airy abstractions such as 
“small events can have large effects” while “large events have only small effects.”
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of us who live long enough to see its new incarnation. According to Jeremy 
Rifkin, markets will give way to networks and ownership will become less 
important. Others foresee that work will become more flexible; organizations 
will become more decentralized and organic; and economic scarcity will 
become less severe. Moreover, bandwidth will be unlimited; the information 
revolution will make us more knowledgeable and perhaps wiser; society will 
coalesce again; and the government sphere will drastically shrink. By way of 
contrast, I believe that power and wealth will continue to be important in com­
ing decades; that economic scarcities will persist and, therefore, so will conflicts 
of interest in the allocation of goods and services; and that the dead hands of 
history and custom limit possible changes in the economic system.
Because so many past predictions of the future have proven so spectacularly 
wrong, in recent years many futurists have turned away from making simple 
forecasts. One increasingly common approach is scenario analysis, in which the 
future is imagined on the basis of alternative assumptions. What would happen 
in the coming decades if population continues to grow exponentially and raw 
material scarcities become acute? Or if population stopped growing and materi­
al scarcities become less acute? What would happen if the pace of globalization 
accelerates, but in a way such that developments are structured by a series of ad 
hoc arrangements between governments, rather than the decisive interventions 
of some type of future world government? How would these scenarios of the 
future be different if human nature were more or less adaptable to particular 
forces of change? Some take this approach one step further and envision alter­
native future worlds. For instance, in 1986 William Halal foresaw only three 
main possibilities of the U.S. economic system in 2000: greater corporate dom­
ination, more control over the economy by government bureaucracies, or “dem­
ocratic free enterprise.” From an equally broad perspective, the U.S. Commis­
sion on National Security/21st Century foresees the world economy in terms of 
four possibilities: globalism triumphant; a democratic peace of cooperating but 
sovereign nations; nationalist protectionism; or division and mayhem.
Such scenario exercises are extremely useful for contingency planning (by 
individuals, business firms, and governments) and for exploring the implications 
of certain crucial decisions or changes of a set of crucial parameters of the econ­
omy. Some, such as Herman Kahn or Gilberto Gallopin, have provided imagi­
native and insightful analyses. Nevertheless, scenarios are not predictions unless 
supplemented by additional analysis. That is, we have no assurance about the 
probabilities of the various scenarios or whether all of the most likely possible 
outcomes are explored. Although such an approach permits a limited number of 
concrete possibilities to be taken into account in a vivid and stimulating fashion, 
it can obscure underlying (and impersonal) causal forces by placing too much 
weight on our ability to change the course of history.
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My approach is different. Because I stress analysis of the causes underlying 
various changes, I generally focus on the most likely outcomes. In cases where 
counteracting forces are at work, such as an acute scarcity of raw materials 
(Chapter 6) or a variety of possible changes in demographic variables (Chapter 
2), alternative scenarios must, of course, be specified. Although I often try to 
indicate when policy interventions might be helpful, in many cases it does not 
seem likely that such measures will be taken, because of the relative strength of 
contending political interests. Moreover, in certain cases, such as the slowdown 
I predict in future economic growth (Chapter 2), governmental intervention to 
ameliorate the problem is limited because the major cause cannot be greatly 
influenced by policy, namely a demographic shift resulting in a change in the 
ratio of active workers who save and retired people who draw down their sav­
ings.
B. Possibilities of Capitalism*
Most studies of the future dealing with economic matters focus on the econ­
omy; I focus instead on the economic system. After briefly distinguishing 
between the two concepts, I examine a variety of different types of capitalist 
systems to show the possible directions that the U.S. economic system might take.
1. The Economy
The economy consists of the myriad activities involved in production, con­
sumption, and the distribution of goods and income. Production involves the use 
of technology, natural resources, land, labor, and capital, both physical and 
human (such as education). Distribution occurs not only through the market but 
through gifts, grants, non-market trades and various governmental measures 
such as transfers, subsidies, or tax breaks.
Much has been written about the future of the economy. Leaving aside fore­
casts about technology (“in 2050, every home will have robots carrying out the 
major share of the housework”), several crucial arguments play an important 
role in such analyses and it is worthwhile to review briefly three of the most 
important and credible propositions (see External Appendix X-1.1 for more 
detailed supporting evidence).
In the text of this section I refer to studies by Bell (1973), Esping-Andersen (1990), Pryor 
(1996), and Soskice (1999).
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One prediction is called Petty’s “law”: Over the course of economic devel­
opment, the labor force shifts away from agriculture toward manufacturing and 
thence to services, an hypothesis that receives ample empirical support. Two 
serious problems with this approach arise: First, since services are carried out in 
all sectors, the share of the labor force in the formal “service sector” depends 
upon the degree to which such services are spun off into separate entities. Sec­
ond, “services”are undifferentiated and, since various services currently employ 
more than three quarters of the labor force, this law is not too helpful for dis­
cussing the future.’
Another important prediction, amply supported by evidence for past years, is 
that the share of the labor force producing information will increase, while the 
share of workers producing goods or homemaking services will decline. In 
short, the knowledge industries are gaining in relative importance, a phenome­
non obvious to anyone at the end of the 20th century, but not to many a gener­
ation ago when pioneering social scientists such as Daniel Bell originally point­
ed out this development.
Yet another hypothesis is that the economy will develop a more complex 
structure. In this context structural complexity refers to three phenomena: the 
information requirements for the system to function; the heterogeneity of deci­
sion-making units (for instance, individuals or firms); and the extensiveness of 
the interrelations between different sectors of the economy. Elsewhere I devel­
op a series of quantitative indicators to demonstrate increasing structural com­
plexity of many aspects—but not all—of the economy.
Many other interesting hypotheses have been offered about long-term trends 
in the economy. It is, however, not my intention to review them here, because 
few have great relevance to the economic system per se. That is, these trends, 
like those summarized by Petty’s law or the shift in occupational structure or the 
increasing complexity of the economy, have occurred in industrial economies, 
regardless of system. They are neither system-determining nor system-deter-
’ Many have tried to repair this second failing. Daniel Bell (1973) suggested dividing services 
into three groups: industrial services (transportation and utilities), business services (trade, 
finance, insurance, and real estate) and human services (health, education, research and devel­
opment, recreation and entertainment, government). A much different approach is to divide the 
various industries in the economy according to whether they deal primarily with other busi­
nesses (either providing goods or services) or, instead, with consumers (providing goods or 
services), either in a business or a non-commercial relationship. This exercise is carried out in 
External Appendix X-1.1 and shows that in the U.S., the share of the labor force producing and 
moving goods at a distance has considerably declined, while the share of those providing serv­
ices to other businesses or consumers has increased, and, finally, the share of those providing 
collective services (education, social services, and government) increased up to 1975 and then 
leveled off for the next quarter century.
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mined, but, instead, are a function of economic development and technological change.
It is, of course, necessary to give attention to changes in the economy to show 
the context of the future economic system. But this is not my primary concern.
2. The Economic System
According to a common formulation, an economic system consists of insti­
tutions and organizations. Institutions consist of the rules, laws, and customs 
that constrain and guide economic activities. Organizations are groups of indi­
viduals working together for at least one common purpose and whose joint 
actions have an impact on the allocation of goods and services, for instance, a 
corporation or a cooperative. The interaction of institutions and organizations 
generates mechanisms that lead to production, distribution, and consumption of 
goods and services, for instance, particular kinds of markets or governmental allocations.
While such an abstract approach does not take us very far in predicting the 
fate of U.S. capitalism, it does help us frame the topic at hand. It means, for 
instance, that in discussing the economic system, we must take into account not 
only strictly economic factors but also political and social factors, at least in so 
far as they influence economic outcomes.
Capitalism is commonly considered to be an economic system with three 
major features: (i) markets serve as the primary means by which goods, servic­
es, and factors of production (land, labor, and capital) are allocated; (ii) the 
rights of private property are crucial and the owners’ prospect of receiving prof­
its serves as a primary incentive for their engaging in economic activities; and 
(iii) the direct roles in the economy of collective organizations such as the gov­
ernment, the church, or charitable foundations are relatively small. Unfortu­
nately, this kind of definition is so general that it obscures the differences 
between various kinds of capitalism.
I can illustrate contrasting forms of capitalism by presenting two other ways 
of looking at economic systems of industrial nations. The first is a broad 
approach, taking into account various combinations of political, social, and eco­
nomic factors; the second is a narrower approach that focuses on certain micro- 
structural aspects of the system. In later chapters, I look briefly at still other 
major differences in the institutions and organizations of capitalist systems.
3. Capitalist Systems: A Broad Approach
From this perspective economic systems can be defined in terms of 
three dimensions:
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One dimension is primarily political—the relative importance of govern­
mental participation in the economy through expenditures, regulation, or own­
ership of the means of production. Government expenditures include not only 
the financing of such traditional functions as diplomacy, internal or external 
security, or education but also investment to provide the physical and human 
infrastructure of the economy, subsidies to encourage particular types of pro­
duction, and transfers of resources from one group to another. Governmental 
regulation includes not just micro-economic rules that constrain and guide par­
ticular economic activities, but also monetary and fiscal policies that are 
designed to stabilize the economy either through the governmental budget or the 
central bank.
The second dimension is almost exclusively economic—the extent to which 
open and competitive markets influence the economy, in contrast to markets 
characterized by oligopoly or monopoly or markets heavily influenced or mod­
ified by social or religious constraints.
The third dimension is primarily social—the degree of social solidarity. This 
designates not just the extent to which people agree on the basic ground rules 
regulating their economic interactions and are able and willing to work cooper­
atively on projects of mutual interest, but also the isolation of particular social 
groups from each other on the basis of income, race, or some other characteris­
tic. The economic implications of social solidarity are manifold and include the 
relative importance of charitable giving; the willingness of the population to tax 
itself in order to equalize income and life chances; the honesty and efficiency of 
the government; and the readiness to resolve economic differences through 
negotiation and other social mechanisms that submerge individual interests in 
the interests of the entire society. In the following chapters I focus particular 
attention on social trust, “social capital,” and inequality, which are three meas­
urable manifestations of social solidarity.
These three dimensions of capitalism can be combined, as shown in Chart 1.1. 
Such an exercise yields eight different types of economic systems, and it is rel­
evant for the rest of my argument to focus brief attention on those in the lower 
part of the diagram where the government influence is relatively low.
Americans are most familiar, with the liberal market economy, where social 
solidarity is sufficient to insure general agreement on a set of ground rules for 
carrying out economic activities, and a generally accepted mechanism is avail­
able to enforce them. Although American individualism may seem antithetical 
to social solidarity, this social bond is sufficiently strong to allow market trans­
actions to occur with a minimum of friction.
If both social solidarity and governmental influence are low, we have anar­
chy of the type described by Thomas Hobbes as a war of one against all. Exam­
ples of such a system are seen in various types of chaotic economies in the past
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or, to a certain extent, in the Russian economy of the 1990s. The existence of 
such economic systems puts in sharp relief the key role social solidarity plays 
in liberal capitalism.
In an economic system composed primarily of large corporations with little 
competition and with a subservient or accommodating government, we have oli­
garchic capitalism. The society and economy are dominated by a relatively 
small number of corporate executives with a high degree of political and eco­
nomic power. In the following chapters I pay considerable attention to the pos­
sibility that the U.S. economic system is moving in this direction.
If social solidarity is high but open economic competition is low, disputes 
can be settled through negotiations of capital, labor, and consumer (or govern­
mental) interests on an industrial or national level. I designate such an econom­
ic system as decentralized corporatism. In the first years after World War II, the 
economic systems of both Austria and the Netherlands began to move toward 
such a system. In more recent years, however, such national negotiations have 
given way to negotiated agreements on the industry level, a phenomenon receiv­
ing attention in the next typological exercise.
Chart 1.1. Economic Systems of Industrialized Economies
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In the following chapters I specify particular economic roles of the U.S. gov­
ernment that will increase and decrease in importance. Nevertheless, I argue that 
the overall governmental influence on the U.S. economy will probably not 
greatly increase. For the purposes of this discussion, therefore, it is not relevant 
to consider the other four economic systems in the diagram.*
What is important is to determine the direction along each of these axes that 
U.S. capitalism has been traveling and whether it is likely to change course. In 
the second half of the 20th century the U.S. economic system moved toward 
increased governmental influence and, in the last quarter of the century (as 
argued in Chapter 7), decreased social solidarity. Key themes of this book are 
that, in the coming decades, social solidarity will continue to decline, as well as 
market competition, and, as a result, the U.S. economic system will move from 
a liberal market economy toward an oligarchic market economy.
While Chart 1.1 provides a useful organizing device, it does not begin to 
cover all the different dimensions of capitalism and does not capture certain key 
social and political dimensions. For instance, the chart says nothing about the 
type of government, so that two types of liberal (in an economic sense) capital­
ist systems can be found in the same part of the chart, one with a democratic 
government, the other with an authoritarian government that does not greatly 
intervene in the economy (for example, the economic system in Chile under 
General Augusto Pinochet).
Because of the qualitative nature of the three dimensions, such an approach 
also does not readily allow quantitative comparisons between, let us say, differ­
ent OECD nations. Nevertheless, it does permit us to organize a qualitative dis­
cussion of some major directions in which the U.S. economic systems might 
change. Since multiple causal forces are acting on most economic systems, such 
a schema also permits us at the end of the book to line up the various forces dis-
« A situation where both social solidarity and economic competition are low, and where the gov­
ernment allocates resources, represents a centrally planned economy. Such an economic system 
has both communist and fascist versions, depending on whether property is owned (and profits 
are taken) by the government or by private interests.
An economic system where both open economic competition and social solidarity are high, 
but where the government plays a major role in redistributing income is the welfare state or a 
social market economy.
Two less famihar economic systems can also be specified. A rotating authoritarian, interven­
tionist economy occurs in a police state where strong governmental intervention is necessary to 
keep certain aspects of the economy functioning and yet open economic competition occurs in 
many parts of the economy and the authoritarian leaders are often changed (even, perhaps, by 
some type of election), so that different economic interests take control from time to time.
Utopian ^rvialism occurs when both the government influence and social solidarity play key 
roles and little open economic competition occurs. This system appears unstable.
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cussed in each chapter in a systematic manner, so that possible directions of 
overall change can be established. For instance, if the social glue holding the 
economy together dissolves (see Chapter 7), liberal capitalism might be slowly 
replaced by Hobbesian anarchy or mafia capitalism. But if other causal forces 
are working in other directions and if industrial consolidation continues unabat­
ed (Chapters 9 and 10), the U.S. might arrive at oligarchic capitalism. If income 
inequalities continue to increase (Chapter 4), the U.S. might be pushed toward 
a rotating authoritarian, interventionist economy, if only to maintain domestic 
political order. Or a serious ecological crisis that cannot be mastered by market 
incentives (Chapter 6) might move the U.S. economic system toward a central­
ly planned economy.
In brief, the chart although incomplete provides a useful way of structuring 
the discussion so that we can separate and relate the consequences of a large 
number of possible causes.
4. Capitalist Systems: A Narrower Economic Perspective
Other ways of looking at various capitalist systems allow more quantitative 
comparison. The typology discussed below focuses on more strictly economic 
phenomena and uses two dimensions that have been explored by a number of 
European economists. Such an approach reveals some major differences 
between U.S. capitalism and that of most other OECD nations.
One crucial distinction in the production sphere is the degree to which eco­
nomic activities such as labor negotiations, apprentice programs, the setting of 
standards, allocation of credit, or even research are carried out either at the com­
pany level, the industrial level (for instance, by trade associations) or at the 
national level (by various types of joint committees of representatives from 
industry, labor, and government). If the government plays primarily a coordi­
nating role, such supra-enterprise activities represent a type of corporatism (in 
Chart 1.1) David Soskice presents evidence that such supra-enterprise coordi­
nation also has an important impact on those lines of production in which the 
nation has a comparative advantage.
A second crucial distinction is the type of governmental participation in the 
economy. In a particularly insightful analysis of the relation between citizen and 
state, Gpsta Esping-Andersen distinguishes two contrasting approaches toward 
governmental welfare expenditures. Some governments base their welfare trans­
fers on the principle that all individuals have an entitlement to the same mone­
tary amount, a system I label “universal welfare system.” For instance, all might 
receive roughly the same old age pension, independent on what they had previ­
ously contributed to the pension system. Other nations tailor such transfers to
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New Zealand, U.K. Canada, U.S.
Note: For the distribution of nations according to their welfare system I use the evaluations of 
Esping-Andersen (1990), who defines this ranking in terms of “decommodification of labor.” For 
coordination I use an unweighted average of scales of “centralization” and “coordination” by the 
OECD (1997-a, p. 71), scaling the pluses or minuses as an eighth of a point. The OECD shows 
(p.73) that their rankings are quite similar to those of nine other studies. The rankings by Soskice 
(1999), which are based on the degree of interlocking directorates of large enterprises in the vari­
ous countries, are also quite similar.
individuals on the basis of either their economic need (defined by some gov- 
emmentally established standards) or their previous work; I label this approach 
a “particularistic welfare system.”
Table 1.1 combines these criteria and places various OECD nations in the 
appropriate quadrants. The results show that the institutions and organizations 
of U.S. and Canadian economic systems are quite different from those of other 
OECD nations. While this kind of typology is highly suggestive, we must avoid 
two possible errors of interpretation.
• No simple one-to-one relationship exists between the types of capitalist 
system shown in Table 1.1 and various indicators of economic performance. For 
instance, the type of welfare system and the cdordination above the level of the 
enterprise are not significantly related to the growth of per capita GDP, other 
possible causal factors held constant.’ Contrary to expectations, the inequality 
of family income is not significantly related to the type of welfare system, 
although it is inversely related to coordination of production above the enter­
prise level, other factors held constant. Such results do not mean that the eco-
’> In these regression experiments the explanatory variables were the per capita GDP, the ratio of
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nomic system defined according to these criteria has little influence on eco­
nomic performance, but rather that we must proceed with caution.
Given that no single type of capitalist system clearly outperforms the others, 
there is also little reason to believe that various types of capitalist systems will 
converge toward a common model along these characteristics.' This result also 
means that U.S. capitalism is not necessarily superior or inferior to these other 
economic systems.
• The placement of economies along the two dimensions of the typology 
cannot be easily tied to other features of their society. For instance, my experi­
ments to use results from the World Value Study to determine if such data would 
predict the placement of various nations in Table 1.1 were totally unsuccessful.’ 
That should come as no surprise because the economic system of a particular 
nation is the outcome of a complex mix of historical, economic, political, and 
social factors that do not easily lend themselves to such a simplistic approach.
Of course, many other typologies of capitalism can be constructed, depend­
ing on the purpose of the discussion. For instance, I draw on quantitative analy­
ses of the relative importance of government expenditures, regulation, and own­
ership from industrialized OECD nations to construct Table 13.1. This analysis 
shows—not unexpectedly—that the U.S., the U.K., Japan, and Switzerland are 
the nations where the government plays the smallest role in economic life along 
all three dimensions.
To provide perspective on U.S. capitalism, I carry out in this book a number 
of comparisons between various industrialized OECD nations. In almost all 
cases the U.S. appears almost alone at one extreme, and the results in 
Table 1.1 preview these findings. Such exercises provide evidence from the 
economic sphere of “American exceptionalism,” a theme that in­
tellectuals and scholars from various disciplines have been exploring for the 
last several centuries.”
trade to GDP, the logarithm of the population, and the system variable, all for 1995. The vari­
ables to be explained included were per capita GDP growth from 1985 to 1995 and a measure 
(Gini coefficient) of family income inequality, corrected for size of family.
‘ Freeman (2000) carried out a useful empirical analysis of such lack of convergence in the area 
of labor-market institutions.
’ Using national data from Inglehart, Basanez and Moreno (1998), 1 carried out several statistical 
experiments using factor analysis. None of the derived dimensions revealed any correlation of 
rankings with the countries in Thble 1.1. Simple correlation of various value scales did, however, 
yield some surprising results. For instance, scales for three values composing the alleged 
“protestant ethic” namely thrift (Variable 232), hard work (V-228), and entrepreneurship (V- 
323), yielded quite different rankings of the various OECD nations.
Almost three hundred years ago travelers and scholars began to remark on the difference
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Given that the U.S. economic system has had a much different past than that 
of most other industrialized nations, and that its present configuration of insti­
tutions and organizations is also special, it seems likely that the future U.S. eco­
nomic system should also be unique. Even the economic systems of Canada and 
the U.S., which appear in the same quadrant in Table 1.1, operate quite differ­
ently in other ways, so that their future economic systems will probably diverge 
as well.
As a result of American exceptionalism, we cannot learn about the future of 
U.S. capitalism by looking at the future of capitalism in general. Obviously, 
changes in other capitalist nations will influence developments in the U.S. Nev­
ertheless, for better or worse, the fate of the U.S. economic system will be spe­
cial, a function of its unique past and present.
C. Change in Advanced Capitalist Systems"
As noted above, I reject the view that U.S. capitalism will not greatly change. 
I also reject the hypothesis that change in the U.S. economy and economic sys­
tem is accelerating and will continue on this rising path in the coming decades. 
The arguments underlying these assertions are presented in External Appendix X-1.2.
In analyzing how economic systems change, neoclassical economists would 
argue that we should follow the great Victorian economist Alfred Marshall, 
whose watchword was the Latin aphorism “nature does not take leaps.” As a 
result, he focused on incremental or marginal changes in institutions, economic 
organizations, and economic variables. But according to the recent theory of 
punctuated equilibrium, we must employ a slightly different watchword, name­
ly “nature only occasionally take leaps.” I might also add that from a long his­
torical perspective some of these leaps in economic institutions and systems
between the old and new worlds. By the 19th century remarks about “American exceptionalism” 
usually included the key notion of the lack of a feudal tradition in the new world, for instance, 
a poem by Goethe (1988 (1825?)) (“America, you have it better than this old continent. You have 
no crumbling castles and fallen battlements. And in these present times you have no blight, of 
useless memories or senseless fights....”). The most careful and lengthy assessment is by deToc- 
queville (1969 (1835)). In the 20th century this intellectual tradition continued with the useful 
studies by Louis Harzt (1955) and Seymour Martin Lipset (1996). In the narrower field of eco­
nomics, books by Michel Albert (1993) or Charles Hampden-lbmer and Alfons Trompenaars 
(1993) provide interesting insights. Contrary to the impression gained from Table 1.1, there are 
also significant differences in the economic system of Canada and the U.S., as argued by Lipset 
(1996, Chapter 3; and Card and Freeman (1993)
" In this section I refer to my research published in Pryor (2000-c).
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appear to be only short hops or pirouettes; witness, the rapid rise and similarly 
speedy fall of fascism in the 1930s and 1940s or of centrally planned socialist 
systems in Eastern Europe from the late 1940s to 1990.
Because economic systems usually change more by evolution than by revo­
lution, structural discontinuities do not often occur and, moreover, they are 
notoriously difficult to predict. Sometimes such structural changes result from 
the outcome of political struggle. In other cases the underlying cause is techno­
logical change, and in the future, the advances in biotechnology, genetics, or in 
nano-technology might have such an impact. In the coming decades, climatic 
change or acute scarcities of key raw materials such as oil might also result in a 
structural leap of the economic system. Finally, for certain institutions and 
organizations, changes in government economic policies might also have such 
an effect.
In some cases in later chapters, I try to indicate where such structural dis­
continuities might arise, even though they may be impossible to foresee or, in 
many cases (for instance, where technology is involved), to imagine. Neverthe­
less, both to avoid taking too many flights of speculative fancy based merely on 
subjective hunches and to stay close to the available empirical evidence, I base 
my argument on the assumption that such structural wildcards will not have an 
enormous influence on the future evolution of American capitalism in the next 
half century.
Further discussion of my analytic techniques for studying the future of U.S. 
capitalism does not seem necessary at this point. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile 
to mention briefly certain techniques that I avoid. For the most part I eschew sys­
tematic scenario analysis, because the number of permutations and combinations 
are endless and tax both the patience and the memory of the reader. I also avoid 
placing too much emphasis on single causes—a favorite device of those writing 
science fiction or sketching utopias and dystopias, because, in most cases, many 
causal factors influence outcomes (often in opposite directions). Finally, I do not 
find it necessary to employ highly technical econometric forecasting techniques, 
primarily because the critical parameters underlying institutional and systemic 
change do not easily lend themselves to such an analysis.
In brief, I am trying to analyze the most probable future of the economic sys­
tem on the basis of the best information currently available, not on the entire 
range of possible changes that the economic system might experience. I focus 
more on the petits pas, rather than any possible and unpredictable grand jete, 
that the economic system might take. To keep the analysis orderly, I also 
separate the immediate causes of systemic change into two basic sets: internal 
and external.
Internal forces are immediately related to the economy and include global­
ization, gradual changes in technology such as the relative fall in communica-
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tion costs), shifts in the demographic structure, or policy blunders by the gov­
ernment. I argue in External Appendix X-1.3 that the latter were a major cause 
of the collapse of the Soviet economic system. Dysfunctional operations of 
major economic institutions or organizations also serve as an important impetus 
for change. For instance, the relatively poor economic performance of the U.K. 
from 1950 through 1980 played an important role in encouraging new political 
forces to move the economic system from one of the most statist economies in 
Western Europe in the early 1960s to one of the least by the end of the century 
(see Chapter 13). Economic events which are politically intolerable represent 
another internal cause of change. For instance, in the U.S. many governmental 
regulations on banks in the 1990s originated in the 1930s as a direct response to 
the bank failures during the Great Depression.
External forces include changes in the ecological, social, and political cir­
cumstances, trends discussed in Chapters 6 through 8. Ecological changes 
include raw material scarcities or increasing pollution and global warming. 
Changes in the political environment not closely related to the economy include 
those attributable to wars, shifting ideologies and attitudes toward government, 
and evolving configurations of civil society. Some of these external causes of 
systemic change are difficult to predict, while others lend themselves to sys­
tematic analysis. A major purpose of my discussion is to sort through the possi­
ble external forces acting upon the system to determine which permit responsi­
ble forecasting.
Such a focus on immediate causes of change to the economic system should 
not, of course, blind us to the fact that the ultimate causes may be different. For 
instance, the ultimate cause of a change in the external environment, such as 
pollution or global warming, might be unregulated economic activities; and the 
ultimate cause of a change in the income distribution might be political or 
social. Nevertheless, the distinction between immediate external and internal 
causes of change allows us to go about the analysis of specific causes in a rela­
tively simple fashion, without having to solve the deep problems of ultimate 
causation.
Although economic systems can mutate into quite different forms in a slow 
and evolutionary fashion, few people are conscious of these major structural 
changes. This lack of awareness stems in part from the complexity of the sys­
tem, especially since it is difficult to measure and understand these structural 
elements. Indeed, many of these changes represent abstractions far removed 
from most aspects of normal daily life. This lack of awareness is also due to the 
passage of time and the isolation of one generation from the experience of 
another—grandchildren usually have little knowledge of the concrete circum­
stances of how their grandparents lived. My purpose is to increase awareness of 
such systemic changes.
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D. Approaches toward Prediction”
My approach toward prediction—and, more modestly, the specification of 
tendencies—is influenced by the dismal track record of futurology. I then draw 
certain brief lessons from these shortcomings.
1. Lessons from the Past
At the 1892/93 World’s Fair in Chicago, some eminent Americans were 
asked to make their predictions about the U.S. a century hence. These short 
essays, published in a book by Dave Walter, make amusing reading. A series of 
radio broadcasts in the late 1960s asked another select group to make their pre­
dictions about what the U.S. would be like in 2000. These broadcasts, published 
in a book by Irving A. Falk, evoke a similar reaction. How could the forecasts 
have been so mistaken?
Some of the errors are elemental. Many forecasters confused the world as it 
should be with the world as it actually will be. Many confused a “possibility” 
with a “high probability,” and let their fantasies run amok, paying little attention 
to the close connection between past and future. Finally, many disregarded Tal­
leyrand’s ardent exhortation that we must, above all, avoid enthusiasm. Thus, 
we have intelligent public personalities like Hubert H. Humphery predicting in 
the late 1960s that by 2000 we will be living on the floor of the ocean, utilizing 
tides as energy sources; scientists will have virtually eliminated bacterial and 
viral diseases; robots will be used for everyday work; we will speak a universal 
language; we will control the weather; and commercial transport will be carried 
out by ballistic missiles.
The record of prophecies concerned with technology and science is similar­
ly disappointing. In a fascinating book Steven Schnaars presents a catalogue of 
prediction errors made in the 20th century by alleged experts.” He examines, for 
instance, a well-known set of forecasts made by two highly regarded futurists, 
Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, for the year 2000 and shows that only 
about 25 percent of their predictions were realized. Even when more people are 
drawn into these exercises in prediction, the record of success is not much bet­
ter. For instance, when Industrial Research surveyed 1,433 scientists and engi­
neers in 1968 about the predictions in the Kahn-Wiener list, they proved grossly
” In this section I refer to studies by Anon. (1920), Anon (1968), Bell (1973), (1976),Gordon and 
Helmer (1964), Humphrey (in Falk (1970)), Kahn and Wiener (1967), Schnaars (1989), and 
Walter (1992), and Wise (1976).
George Wise’s (1976) study of predictive success is also useful, even though it is much less13
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optimistic; slightly less than one third of the major technological 
breakthroughs that they expected to occur between 1975 and 2000 actually 
came about.
The margin of forecast error depends, of course, on the subject ot the pre­
dictions and the period for which the predictions are made. From an interesting 
set of predictions made in 1920 in Scientific American, I calculate that roughly 
65 percent were actually realized by 1950. But most of these predictions are 
banal—^for instance, that a bridge would be built where the Golden Gate bridge 
now stands in San Francisco. In 1958 the RAND Corporation carried out a more 
ambitious study, utilizing a Delphi technique (a structured interaction between 
the predictors) and an all-star cast of scientists. According to my calculations, 
only about 25 percent of the predictions made about advances m the pure sci­
ences or in space exploration by the year 2000 were actually realized.'* One 
unnamed participant noted in the Appendix of this study: “I believe that one 
overwhelming breakthrough ... is imminent in the field of behavioral sciences. 
It will be a realization that we cannot successfully predict the [technological] 
future because its nature depends on discoveries as yet unmade and inventions 
as yet uninvented.”
Accurately forecasting the impact of such technological changes is no easi­
er. George Wise looked at the predicted social, political, or economic effects of 
particular technological changes and found incredible blunders, for instance, the 
forecast in 1900 that automobile usage would never take hold. Only 25 percent 
of all these predictions of effects came true, a result to give pause to those con­
fidently discussing the impact of e-commerce (see Chapter 10) on competition.
In the political and economic field such prediction errors are, of course, 
legion. Before World War II, few predicted the fall of the colonial system. After 
the war, few foresaw the rise of militant Islam. In the economic field, few fore­
saw the energy crisis, the dramatic economic success of South Korea and Tai­
wan, or the rise and fall (and rise again?) of Japanese industry. Accurate pre­
diction of the long-term behavior of certain economic variables such as 
population or GDP has also proven elusive. For instance, writing in 1967 Kahn 
and Wiener predicted that in the year 2000, the U.S. population would be 318.4
plete than Schnaar’s. I find it depressing that it is outsiders, rather than those m the forecasting 
mainstream, who carry out research on prediction errors. For instance, the various conUibutors 
to the anniversary issue of Technological Forecasting and Social Clumge, 62, No. 1 and 2 
(August/September/1999) were so busy congratulating themselves that none womed about 
whether the enterprise in which they were engaged had any validity.
1* If any additional proof is needed about the weaknesses of the Delphi technique for forecasting, 
it can be found in an essay by Tashakori, et al. (1988). They used this methodology to predict 
that between 1988 and 2000 there would be a significant decline in individualism in Amenca.
Setting the Stage 19
million, when it actually turned out to be closer to 275 million. It is noteworthy 
that about half of the U.S. population in 2000 was alive in 1967, which means 
that their prediction error appears even worse than at first sight.
Perhaps the worst record of prediction is in the social realm, particularly by 
those who have the strongest faith in “progress” of the perfectability of 
humankind. But many of these “forecasts” are too casual to deserve analysis.
Many false prophecies are, of course, random guesses based on little evi­
dence other than hunches and anecdotes. In this regard we must keep in mind 
the observation attributed to Cato the Elder, “I wonder that a soothsayer doesn’t 
laugh when he sees another soothsayer.’”’ Cicero adds, “For how many things 
predicted by them really come true? If any do come true, then what reasons can 
be advanced why the agreement of the events with the prophecy may not be due 
to chance.”
Other wrong predictions are due to an insufficient appreciation of the ran­
domness of events and margins for error. In making their population forecast 
Kahn and Wiener were surely aware of the considerable fluctuations over time 
in birth rates and the fact that birth rates in the middle 1960s, when they made 
their forecast, were relatively high. They chose, for reasons unknown, to believe 
that the situation in the 1960s would last at least for the next three decades.
An even deeper and more subtle forecasting error in these studies arises 
because the predictor focuses attention on causal relationships that are true only 
if all other causal factors are held constant and, as a result, does not examine the 
behavior of these other causal factors. For instance, many have argued that the 
retirement age will fall without taking into account that our longer life expectan­
cy means that more accumulated savings are needed to finance retirement.
Fortunately, the future of social and economic structures appears easier to 
predict than particular events or variables, in large part because structures usu­
ally change only slowly and, in many cases, the causal variables are clearer. A 
well-known example is the work of Daniel Bell on changes in contemporary 
capitalism and the coming post-industrial society. Starting with ideas about the 
shift of the labor force to services and to knowledge-intensive occupations, he 
argues a number of propositions that have subsequently become commonplace, 
for instance, that post-industrial society will be organized around knowledge (of 
which a central element is theoretical knowledge), that education will more and 
more be the key to social mobility and economic advancement, and that power 
will be defined increasingly in terms of institutional position, rather than just 
personal wealth. He also argued that as the economy shifts more to services, 
labor unions will lose power and membership. From such an approach he made
’’ Cited by Cicero (1926, p. 429).
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a number of startling and insightful predictions which I draw upon in later chapters.
Nevertheless, events have shown Bell to be overly optimistic about the pace 
of change and totally wrong about major aspects of the economic system. For 
instance, he argued:
A post-industrial society ... is increasingly a communal society 
wherein public mechanisms rather than the market become the allo­
cators of goods, and public choice, rather than individual demand, 
becomes the arbiter of services. A communal society by its very 
nature multiplies the definition or rights—the rights of children, of 
students, of the poor, of minorities—and translates them into claims 
of the community. The rise of externalities ... turns clean air, clean 
water, and mass transit into public issues and increases the need for 
social regulation and controls. The demand for higher education and 
better health expands greatly the role of government as funder and 
setter of standards. The need for amenities, the cry for a better qual­
ity of life, brings government into the areas of environment, recre­
ation, and culture.
Perhaps Bell confused what ought to occur, losing sight of political and eco­
nomic feasibility.'* Or perhaps people are less rational than Bell had assumed. 
Or perhaps Bell was simply extrapolating from a few decades in the past and did 
not realize that around the middle 1970s, trends in both government regulations 
and expenditures would sharply change.
2. My Approach
From the mistakes of others, I draw five short but important lessons:
First, I make a conscious effort not to confuse how I want the economy to 
evolve with how it actually will evolve. I find disheartening many of the changes 
I foresee.
Second, forecasting the future requires a careful study of the past and pres­
ent. For this reason I spend considerable effort not just trying to unearth current 
trends but also to determine their causes and to ask whether these causal forces 
can be expected to operate in the future.
In a recent book Robert J. Samuelson (1995) develops these points made by Bell and then 
argues that we can’t afford the taxes to pay for such entitlements, so that a cutback in govern­
mental expenditures is necessary. For my own views on trends in public expenditures, see 
Chapter 12.
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Third, I rely much more on statistics than on anecdotes. Much of the analy­
sis of the economic system and its evolution must, by necessity, be statistical, 
because this is the only way in which the aggregative impact of many different 
events can be evaluated. I try, however, to present the data in a fashion that they 
can be readily understood and to illustrate what they mean through relatively 
concrete examples. For the specialists or those wishing further proof, I place the 
technical details of these calculations and most of the sources in a series of 
appendices.
Fourth, I try from the very beginning of the analysis to take into account the 
uncertainties surrounding any forecasts. Sometimes this means presenting a 
range of estimates or heavily qualifying my conclusions to take particular con­
tingencies into account.
Fifth, at a certain point in all speculations about the future, it becomes impos­
sible to make any kind of responsible forecast. We may not understand exactly 
what is happening in the present; the underlying data for making the forecasts 
may not be very good; or too many causal factors may enter the picture and it 
may not be clear which is strongest. Some phenomena which could greatly 
influence the future of capitalism, for instance, the rise of the internet, might be 
still too new to understand all of their implications. Or, the government, church­
es, or other agencies might step in to solve certain problems if key people come 
to recognize the difficulty and believe they can help to solve it. In brief, because 
we are not all-knowing nor passive witnesses to our fate, the future is, to a cer­
tain extent, indeterminate. In many instances in the following discussion, I sim­
ply note that we have reached the limits of responsible prediction and move to 
another topic.
E. Plan of Attack"
In Chapters 2 through 5,1 look at four of the most important internal causes 
of change of the economic system. These include slower economic growth, 
because of the adverse impact of demographic changes on saving; increasing 
fragility of the economy particularly in the financial sphere; adverse changes in 
the inequality of income; and trends toward international economic integration 
(globalization) and a possible future backlash against this trend. In some major 
respects my evaluation of these factors differs considerably from the majority 
view of the economics profession, at least as recorded in the recent “Millenni­
um Survey.”
In this section the Millennium Survey among economists is by Pryor (2000-b) and reference is 
also made to public opinion studies of the Pew Research Center (Pew, 1999).
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In Chapters 6 through 8,1 examine some important external forces of change 
of U.S. capitalism. These include the impact of changes in the physical envi­
ronment, as well as social, and political changes. In contrast with many well- 
known futurists, I argue that a deteriorating physical environment or raw mate­
rial scarcities will probably have a minor impact on the economic system (even 
though it may have a major effect on the economy), while, by way of contrast, 
declining social cohesiveness will play a crucial role in the future economic sys­
tem. The discussion of political factors focuses not just on wars and revolutions, 
but on more subtle phenomena, such as declining trust toward government, 
which will, in turn, influence the future economic role of the government.
The next four chapters focus directly on the emerging new economic institu­
tions and organizations. Chapters 9 and 10 deal with changes in the structure of 
the private sector, particularly regarding the size of enterprises and the degree of 
industrial concentration in individual markets. In contrast to the conventional 
wisdom, I present evidence that the new information technologies are leading to 
larger, not smaller, enterprises and that market competition is decreasing as 
well. In Chapters 11 and 12,1 discuss changes in governmental intervention in 
the economy, particularly regarding public regulation of production, the extent 
of public ownership, and public expenditures. Despite the weakening of certain 
governmental policy making tools and a decline in government regulation, in 
part due to globalization, I argue that the role of government in other aspects of 
the economy, particularly public expenditures, will increase in importance.
Although I focus most analytic attention on the government and the private 
profit-making sectors, the U.S. economic system has a number of other institu­
tional and organizational complexes that require attention if we are to gain a 
fuller view of how the entire system will evolve. These complexes include home 
production, the underground economy, and the nonprofit and cooperative sec­
tors. These receive brief attention in Chapters 7, 8, and 11 respectively.
Chapter 13 provides an overview. In certain instances, the analyses in partic­
ular chapters point to changes in the opposite direction, so it is necessary to 
assess which set of forces is stronger. I also turn back to the diagram in this 
chapter and argue that it is most likely that U.S. capitalism will move toward an 
oligarchic market economy, rather than remaining as it currently is, or moving 
either toward corporatism or a social market economy. Undoubtedly, my own 
subjective biases influence how much I weigh the various forces in play, but 
readers can, if they wish, make their own estimates from the raw materials that 
I present.
To keep the book readable, I try to minimize footnotes and bunch the refer­
ences at the beginning of each section by author and date. Those wishing fuller 
citations can then consult the bibliography. The appendices contain notes on the 
statistical sources and methods of estimation. They also present short essays on
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specialized topics mentioned in the text that some may feel deserve further elu­
cidation but that are not of direct relevance to the main discussion.
In brief, I try to provide a guidebook to understand the changes that might 
befall U.S. capitalism, to specify the indicators by which they can be observed, 
and to assess some of their major economic impacts. Three warnings are, how­
ever, necessary: If you are looking for a set of easy-to-read, airy speculations 
about our economic future that are stated with absolute certainty and are based 
on a set of piquant anecdotes, my advice is to turn either to astrologers or to 
social science fiction. If you are looking for policy prescriptions, either to has­
ten the advent of a particular new economic system or to preserve the old, you 
will likewise be disappointed: my primary purpose is to diagnose, not to pre­
scribe. In economics as in medicine, however, diagnosis is necessary before the 
proper remedies can be considered. Finally, if you wish confirmation or positive 
feedback to the hyper-optimism about the future of U.S. capitalism revealed in 
surveys of general public opinion surveys, this book is not for you. Although it 
is not my intention to make pessimism fashionable among economists again, I 
show that the U.S. economic system faces some very serious problems in the 
coming decades.
